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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. : 
FRANCISCO A. CANDEDO, : 
Defendant/Petitioner. : Case No. 20080183-SC 
INTRODUCTION 
This Court should reverse because the imposition of a nine-year probationary 
period violated Candcdo's right to due process. The legislatively-stated purpose of 
probation in Utah is not restitution. It is rehabilitation. And Utah's probation statute is 
not rationally related to achieving rehabilitation because it allows probation to extend far 
beyond the time in which rehabilitation occurs. Sec infra Part I. 
This Court should reach Candcdo's due process claim through rule 22(c) of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Candedo does not invoke rule 22(c) to challenge his 
underlying conviction. Rather, he asks this Court to determine whether his 108-month 
probationary term is illegal because it violates substantive due process. This issue is 
within the "sweeping" bounds that this Court has set for rule 22(c). See infra Part II. 
Alternatively, this Court should reach Candcdo's due process claim through the 
exceptional circumstances doctrine. At sentencing, Candedo relied on controlling 
precedent that said Utah's probation statute limits probationary terms to 12 or 36 months. 
Candedo could not predict that this Court would overrule that precedent in Wallace and 
reinterpret the probation statute to allow limitless probation. Thus, denying him the 
opportunity to challenge the legality of the probationary order under the new landscape 
created by Wallace would result in manifest injustice. See infra Part III. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE 
IMPOSITION OE A NINE-YEAR PROBATIONARY PERIOD 
VIOLATED CANDEDO'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS 
First, Candedo challenges the trial court's decision to impose a 108-month 
probationary period. This was the trial court's final judgment and is the order before this 
Court for review. Thus, this Court should decide Candedo's due process claim based on 
the trial court's final judgment and not on possible decisions that the trial court might 
make in the future. Sec infra Part FA. 
Second. Candedo was selected as a young or unhardencd criminal likely to be 
rehabilitated. Having qualified for probation, therefore, he has the right to a fair, non-
arbitrary sentence. In other words, he has the right to regain his liberty when his 
probationary term is no longer rationally related to rehabilitation. See infra Part FB. 
Third, for the reasons stated in Candedo's opening brief, the right implicated in 
this case is likely a fundamental right. Sice PeFr Br. at 25-31. Accordingly, this Court 
should apply a heightened degree of scrutiny. See icL This Court need not determine 
whether Candedo's claim implicates a fundamental right, however, because as explained 
2 
in section I.C., Candcdo's nine-year probationary period is not rationally related to the 
legislatively-stated purpose of Utah's probation statute. See supra Part I.C. 
A. This Court Should Review the Trial Court's Final Judgment, Not Orders that 
the Trial Court Might Make In the Future. 
Candedo challenges the trial court's final judgment, lie argues that the trial court 
violated due process when it ordered him to serve a 108-month probationary term. S c^ 
Pct'r Br. at 1-2, 7-31. Whether the trial court will ultimately terminate Candcdo's 
probation early is a separate question that is not before this Court. See id. at Add. B 
(Order dated July 11, 2008); but see Resp't Br. at 26-27. 
Besides, given the trial court's reasoning below, it is unlikely that it will terminate 
Candcdo's probation early. The trial court imposed the 108-month probationary period 
for purposes of restitution, not rehabilitation. Sec R. 270:34-35; Resp't Br. at 36 (stating 
probationary purpose "in this case" is "victim restitution"). Because Candedo owes a 
large amount of restitution, it is unlikely that he will be able to pay it in 108 months. Sec 
R. 265:3 (computing restitution at $3,373,060). Thus, assuming it is at all possible to 
predict future orders of the court, it is likely that the trial court will use the statutory 
authority defined by State v. Wallace, 2006 UT 86, 150 P.3d 540, to extend Candcdo's 
probation until restitution is paid in full, even if no violations occur and even if it means 
that Candedo will remain on probation for the rest of his life. S^e Wallace, 2006 UT 86 
at 1| 13 (holding that "a court may terminate probcition for a felony at thirty-six months, or 
it may terminate probation at any other time" (citation omitted)). 
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JS. Having Been Selected as a Young or Unhardcncd Offender Likely to Be 
Rehabilitated, Cancledo Has a Right to Regain His Liberty Once the Purposes 
of Probation Are Complete. 
A defendant docs not have a right to be put on probation. Sec Pct'r Br. at 27-28; 
Rcsp't Br. at 31. And, if placed on probation, the defendant will lose some of his 
constitutional rights. Sec Pct'r Br. at 28: Rcsp't Br. at 31; sec, e.g., In re A.C.C., 2002 
U 1 22. *||26. 44 P.3d 708 (holding that trial court may ''restrict |a defendant's] expectation 
of privacy to be free from random searches" while on probation). 
But, when a defendant is selected as a "young or unhardcncd offender" likely to be 
rehabilitated on probation, he docs not surrender his entire bundle of constitutional rights 
by accepting the opportunity. Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 272 (1943); sec, 
e.g., Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426 (1984) (holding that defendant "does not 
lose" the privilege against self-incrimination when he is on probation); A.C.C., 2002 UT 
22 at *|[22 (holding probationer retains right to privacy, but his right "pales in comparison 
to the privacy interest retained by citizens not on probation"); State v. Velasquez, 672 
P.2d 1254. 1262 (Utah 1983) ("Although |probationers) have diminished Fourth 
Amendment rights as to searches by [probation| officers, that does not mean that police 
officers may engage in warrantless searches and seizures as to [probationers! on the same 
basis as [probation] officers." (citations omitted)). 
In particular, by accepting probation, the defendant does not surrender his right to 
be treated fairly. Sec, e.g., United States v. Guagliardo, 278 l\3d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 
2002) (holding probationer has due process right to probation conditions that arc 
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sufficiently clear to inform him of what conduct is prohibited); McVcy v. State, 863 
N.E.2d 434, 447 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (holding trial court's discretion to set probation 
conditions "is limited by the principle that the conditions imposed must be reasonably 
related to the treatment of the defendant and the protection of public safety"); State v. 
Orr, 2005 UT 92,1|33, 127 P.3d 1213 ('The fundamental fairness requirement of the 
Fourteenth Amendment forbids the revocation of probation when a probationer has failed 
to pay restitution or a fine through no fault of his own." (citation omitted)); State v. 
Cowdelf 626 P.2d 487, 488 (Utah 1981) (w6|l|n revoking a probation, a court may not 
ignore fundamental precepts of fairness protected by the due process clause."); State v. 
Kichlcr. 483 P.2d 887, 889 (Utah 1971) (recognizing that "fairness and the effective use 
of probation demand that a defendant who is placed on probation should have the 
assurance that if he keeps the conditions of his probation it will continue, as contrasted 
with having to live in dread of revocation merely on someone's whim or caprice"). 
A fair probationary sentence is one that docs not arbitrarily extend probation 
beyond the time it is useful to achieving the purpose of probation. Cf. Jackson v. Indiana, 
406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (saying, regarding commitment to a mental institution, that 
"[a|l the least, due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear 
some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed"); Jones v. 
United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983) ("The purpose of commitment following an 
insanity acquittal, like that of civil commitment, is to treat the individual's mental illness 
and protect him and society from his potential dangerousness. The committed acquittce 
is entitled to release when he has recovered his sanity or is no longer dangerous."); State 
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v. Orr, 2005 UT 92, HIT 12, 13, 16, 127 P.3d 1213 (holding that probation extension 
proceedings must meet "the 'minimum requirements of due process'" even though they 
do not deal with '"the immediate, "grievous loss of liberty implicated in a revocation of 
probation/ but instead with a mere continuation of probationary restrictions and the 
'possibility of future revocation'" (citation omitted)). 
In Utah, the purpose of probation is rehabilitation. Sec supra Part I.C.; Pct'r Br. at 
9-10, 27. At the time that the trial court places a defendant on probation, it is not certain 
that he will be rehabilitated. Sec Resp't Br. at 36. But within a relatively short period of 
time--research shows "within five years"—it will become certain. United States v. 
Albano, 698 F.2d 144, 149(2dCir. 1983) (citations omitted); see Pet'r Br. at 29 
(additional citations). If the defendant has not been rehabilitated within five years, it is 
very unlikely that he is going to be. Sec rd. Accordingly, at that point, it is appropriate 
for the trial court to hold a hearing and, based upon a finding that the probationer violated 
a condition of his probation, modify, extend, or revoke probation. Sec Utah Code Ann. § 
77-1 8-1(12) (Supp. 2005). If the defendant has been rehabilitated, however, then 
continuing him on probation for a lengthy or even indefinite period of lime docs not serve 
rehabilitation. !Scc supra Part l .C; Pet'r Br, at 11-15. fo the contrary, it undermines the 
rehabilitation already achieved. See id. 
Accordingly, Utah's probation statute implicates a due process liberty interest 
because it authorizes a trial court to arbitrarily impose any length of probation regardless 
of whether it is rationally related to achieving rehabilitation. Sec Utah Code Ann. §77-
18-l(10)(a)(i); Wallace, 2006 UT 86 at W 1-13 (holding that Utah's probation statute 
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"does not impose any limitation on the length of probationary term that a court may 
impose"); supra Part I.C.; Pct'r Br. at 9-31. This Court should not disregard the due 
process violation simply because the defendant could have elected to be incarcerated if he 
did not like the arbitrary probation terms set by the trial court. Sec RcspT Br. at 31-32. 
To the contrary, this Court should recognize a probationer's right to regain his liberty 
once the purposes of probation are complete and, as explained in section I.C., reverse 
because Candcdo's nine-year probationary term exceeds the limits of constitutionality. 
C. Candedo's Nine-Year Probationary Period Is Not Rationally Related to the 
Legislatively-Stated Purpose of Utah's Probation Statute. 
Candcdo does not argue that this court "'misinterpreted the probation statute" in 
Wallace. Resp't Br. at 46. Instead, Candcdo asks this Court to determine whether our 
probation statute, as written, violates due process because it "docs not impose any 
limitation on the length of probationary term that a court may impose." Wallace, 2006 
UT 86 at ffi|l 1-13; sec PctT Br. at 7-31. 
in Utah, the legislatively-stated purpose of probation is rehabilitation. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-27-1(10) (2003) (defining probation as an "act of grace"); Pct'r Br. at 9-
10 (additional citations); sec Resp't Br. at 39 (conceding that rehabilitation "is an 
important and perhaps even the primary goal of probation"). 
The State has cited no authority to contradict this statement. !Sec RespT Br. at 39 
(citing State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 458 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); State v. Rhodes. 818 
P.2d 1048, 1051 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). In Nuttall the court of appeals discussed 
incarceration, not probation. Nuttall, 861 P.2d at 454. It concluded "that the state is not 
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prohibited from incarcerating an individual Tor purposes other than rehabilitation.'" Id 
at 458 (citation omitted). "One of those 'other purposes' may be to protect society from 
an individual deemed to be a danger to the community." ]d. (citation omitted). 
Similarly, in Rhodes, the court of appeals discussed "factorjsj the trial court may 
consider when making a sentencing determination/' not the statutory purposes of 
probation. Rhodes, 818 P.2d at 1051. It held that "rehabilitation is not the only factor the 
trial court may consider when making a sentencing determination. Other factors include 
deterrence, punishment, restitution, and incapacitation." IcL (citation omitted). 
Restitution, on the other hand, is not a legislatively-stated purpose of probation. 
See Pet'r Br. at 22-25. In its brief, the State lists many statutes, but none of them say 
restitution is a purpose of probation or authorize imposing "long-term probation to enable 
a probationer to fulfill his restitution obligation." Rcsp't Br. at 40-42; sec Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-201(1 )(d) (Supp. 2008) (defining restitution); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
201(2)(c) (authorizing trial court to "sentence a person convicted of an offense . . . to 
probation"); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4)(a) (requiring trial court, "in addition to any 
other sentence it may impose." to "order that the defendant make restitution" if he "is 
convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages"); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-20l(4)(b) (wCIn determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall 
follow the criteria and procedures as provided in . . . |thc| Crime Victims Restitution 
Act"); Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(8)(ix) (Supp. 2005) ("While on probation, and as a 
condition of probation, the court may require that the defendant. . . make restitution . . . 
.**): Utah Code Ann. § 77-37-1(1) (2003) (declaring Legislature's "intent to ensure" that 
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victims' rights "are honored and protected by law"); Utah Code Ann. § 77-37-3(1 )(c) 
(Supp. 2008) (granting victims the right to "seek restitution . . . as provided in . . . 77-
38a-302"); Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(2) (Supp. 2008) (requiring trial court to 
•'determine complete restitution and court-ordered restitution"); Utah Code Ann. § 77-
38a-302(5)(c) (outlining how to calculate restitution). 
In his opening brief Candcdo makes no statement as to whether "the Code 
generally . . . limits probation extensions." Resp't Br. at 47; see Pcl'r Br. at 22-23. 
Rather, to support his argument that restitution "is not a legislatively-stated goal of 
probation in Utah," he notes that the Utah Code authorizes a trial court to "order the 
defendant to pay restitution as a condition of probation," but not to extend "the 
Among the factors to consider when calculating restitution, section 77-38a-302 
lists "the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of restitution 
will impose, with regard to other obligations of the defendant," "the ability of the 
defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on other conditions to be fixed by 
the court," and "the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution 
and the method of payment." See Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(5)(c)(i)-(iii). 
The State claims that the term "other conditions," as used in section 77-3 8a-
302(5)(c)(ii). "reasonably suggests an extended period of probation to accomplish a 
burdensome restitution obligation." Resp't Br. at 42. This claim is unsupported by any 
explanation or citation. Sec Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (stating briefs must contain 
reasoned analysis based upon relevant legal authority); Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, 
<||7, 17 P.3d 1122 ("Failure to provide any analysis or legal authority constitutes 
inadequate briefing." (citations omitted)): State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299. 305 (Utah 
1998) (declaring issue inadequately briefed when the "overall analysis of the issue is so 
lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court"). 
Moreover, this interpretation is contrary to the objective of the section, which is to 
assess whether the defendant's circumstances "make restitution inappropriate." Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(5)(c)(iv); see Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 
1045 (Utah 1991) ("If there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning or application of the 
provisions of an act. it is appropriate to analyze the act in its entirety, in light of its 
objective, and to harmonize its provisions in accordance with its intent and purpose."). 
As explained in the body of this section and in the opening brief, it is also contrary to the 
language of the probation and restitution statutes. See supra Part I.C.; Pcl'r Br. at 19-25. 
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probationary period in order to enforce restitution." Pcl'r Br. at 22-23 (citing Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 77-18-l(8)(a)(ix); 77-18-1(10)(a)(ii)(A); 77-38a-501(2)(b)). 
The State correctly argues that section 77-38a-501(2)(b) (2003) applies only to 
restitution "'regarding costs of incarceration in a county correctional facility." Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-38a-501(2)(a); see Rcsp'l Br. at 48-49. Regardless, the remaining sections 
cited by Candedo support his argument thai restitution is not a legislatively-stated goal of 
probation in Utah and indicate that trial courts arc not authorized to extend probation in 
order to enforce restitution. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-18-1 (8)(a)(ix); 77-18-
l(10)(a)(ii)(A): 77-38a-501 (1). 
"While on probation, and as a condition of probation," a trial court may order a 
defendant to "make restitution." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(8)(a)(ix) (Supp. 2005). "If, 
upon expiration or termination of the probation period under Subsection (10)(a)(i), there 
remains" restitution to be paid, then the trial court "may retain jurisdiction of the case and 
continue the defendant on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the 
payment of |restitution |." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a)(ii)(A). Additionally, a trial 
court "may impose sanctions against the defendant" if he "defaults in the payment of a 
judgment for restitution or any installment ordered/" Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-501(l). 
When read in conjunction with the 12- or 36-month provision included in the 
probation statute, sec Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (10)(a)(i), these sections suggest that the 
Legislature intended a short probationary term focused on rehabilitation followed by a 
long period of bench probation, if necessary, for the limited purpose of enforcing the 
remainder of the restitution order. Sec State v. Dickey, 841 P.2d 1203, 1207 (Utah Ct. 
10 
App. 1992) (Because u[tjhe legislature anticipated . . . situations where the court might. . 
. decide upon a payment schedule for restitution which would extend beyond the 
probation period," it "'provided a separate, limited source of jurisdiction by which the 
court could recall a defendant and hold him or her accountable for full payment of 
restitution."), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993); Pcl'r Br. at 19-22. Its failure to 
enact language to codify this intent was the result of a drafting "defect" that left "the 
provision regarding 36 months . . . nearly meaningless." Wallace, 2006 UT 86 at ^13; 
sccPctTBr. at 19-22.2 
Thus, the Utah Code does not list restitution as a purpose of probation in Utah. It 
makes sense, therefore, that the Utah cases cited by the State also do not rccogni/c 
restitution as a goal of probation. !Sec RcspT Br. at 42-43 (citing Dickey, 841 P.2d at 
1206-07; State v. Orr, 2005 UT 92, ^36, 127 P.3d 1213; State v. AllmendinRcr, 565 P.2d 
1119, 1121 (Utah 1977)). 
In Dickey, the court of appeals held that the "trial court had jurisdiction to enforce 
its previous restitution order" after probation ended by continuing the defendant on bench 
probation. Dickey, 841 P.2d at 1205. In reaching this decision, the court explained that 
~ It is true that Utah, like many jurisdictions, allows a trial court to impose 
restitution as a condition of probation. See Pct'r Br. at 15; Resp't Br. at 44 n.9. As 
explained in Candedo\s opening brief, however, granting a trial court authority to make 
restitution a condition of probation "while" a defendant is on probation docs not give a 
trial court the much broader authority to keep the defendant on probation until restitution 
is paid. Utah Code Ann. § 77-1 8-1 (8)(a)(ix); sec Dickey, 841 P.2d at 1205-09; Smith v. 
Cook. 803 P.2d 788, 791 (Utah 1990) ("The trial court's power to grant, modify, or 
revoke probation is purely statutory, and although a trial court has discretion in these 
matters, the court's discretion must be exercised within the limits imposed by the 
legislature."). 
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the Utah Code gives restitution a "separate purpose" from probation. Id. It also 
"provide] s| independent guidelines for its computation and criteria for its scheduling, 
mandatej s | a specific procedure for court enforcement, and expressly provide) s] for trial 
courts' jurisdiction over the defendant until payment completion." IdL The 
"mispcrception" thai restitution is not an "independent concept" from probation: 
is fostered by the fact that provisions governing orders for both probation 
and restitution are scattered throughout multiple subsections of the criminal 
procedure statute, Utah Code Ann. § 77-1 8-1; the two punishments arc 
intertwined by making one a condition of the other, id_. at § 77-1 8-1(8): and 
the timetables for each necessarily overlap. 
Dickey, 841 P.2d at 1206. In sum, "although the timetables for restitution and probation 
may overlap, the legislature has instructed courts to determine the length of each based 
upon entirely different criteria." IcL at 1207. 
Next, in Orr, this Court did not hold that a defendant's "only incentive to continue 
making restitution payments is to avoid his probation being revoked.'" Resp't Br. at 43 
(quoting Orr, 2005 UT 92 at p 7 ) . To the contrary, this Court held that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion by extending the defendant's probation when he "violated the 
condition of his probation requiring him to pay restitution to his victims." Orr, 2005 UT 
92 at *||36. As support for this decision, this Court noted that the trial court implicitly 
found that the defendant acted willfully and that "other alternatives for punishing 
[dcfcndanl| were inadequate" when it found that the defendant in that case was "'induced 
to repay his victims only when he |was| in the shadow of probation and the threat of 
incarceration [was] held over him.*" Id. at ^|36-37. 
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Finally, in AUmendinger, this Court did not hold that restitution is a statutorily-
stated goal of probation. AUmendinger, 565 P.2d at 1120-21. Rather, it held that the trial 
court had jurisdiction to revoke defendant's probation after the time that his six-month 
jail sentence would have ended but before the one-year probationary term that he agreed 
to serve ended. Id at 1121. When reviewing AUmendinger, it is important to note that 
this Court was interpreting the original probation statute, which allowed a trial court to 
"place the defendant on probation for such period of time as the court shall determine." 
UL at 1120 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-17 (U.C.A. 1953)). This version of the 
statute was changed in 1984, when the Legislature added a 6- or 18-month limitation on 
probation. Sec Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(10)(a) (Interim Supp. 1984). Moreover, 
AUmendinger's holding has not been followed. Since it was published, AUmendinger has 
only been cited twice—in Candcdo and Wallace—and only for the narrow proposition 
that a defendant does "'not have to accept the terms of his probation/" but if he does, he 
"'must abide by them.'" State v. Candcdo, 2008 UT App 4,1[8 n.6, 176 P.3d 459 
(quoting Wallace, 2006 UT 86 at [^19 (quoting AUmendinger, 565 P.2d at 1121)).3 
1
 After Wallace, Utah's probation statute again provides no "limitation on the 
length of probationary term that a court may impose." Wallace, 2006 UT 86 at •JH] 11-13. 
As explained in Candcdo's opening brief, however, this approach is only followed by 
wC|a| few jurisdictions" today. Wayne R. LaFavc et al., Criminal Procedure, § 26.9(a), at 
862 (2007) (hereinafter LaFave, Criminal Procedure); sec PctT Br. at 17-19. The 
majority of a|m|odern statutes" reject this approach as wTmwisc" because *c'|s|uch open-
ended authority not only may subject the offender to a pointlessly extended jeopardy, but 
it aggravates the caseload burden of the probation staff as well.*" LaFavc, Criminal 
Procedure, §26.9(a), at 862 (citation omitted); sec Pct'r Br. at 4 n.3. Moreover, this 
approach violates due process because it undermines the Legislature's stated legitimate 
interest in rehabilitation by making the defendant feel like an outsider even after he is 
13 
In its brief, the State identifies three jurisdictions—Kansas, Kentucky, and 
Maryland- -that "expressly provide! | for lengthy probationary periods to ensure payment 
of restitution." Rcsp't Br. at 43 n.8. In his opening brief, Candedo identified Arizona as 
another such jurisdiction. Pcf r Br. at 22 n.5. In all, therefore, the parties have located 
(bur jurisdictions where restitution is a legislatively-stated purpose of probation/ See 
Pcf r Br. at 22 n.5; Rcsp't Br. at 43 n.8. These jurisdictions clearly express their purpose 
in their statutes and carefully define the expansion permitted. See id. Utah is not among 
these jurisdictions. Sec Rcsp't Br. at 43 n.8. 
The State also identifies one state -Maine - that, according to the State, 
rccogni/cs restitution as a purpose of probation even though its statute does not expressly 
state this purpose. Rcsp't Br. at 42 (citing State v. DadicRo, 617 A.2d 552, 553-55 (Me. 
1992)). In Dadiego. the Supreme Judicial Court held that Maine's statute, as written, 
allows probation terms to run consecutively. Dadiego, 617 A.2d at 554-55. In reaching 
this decision, the Court noted that wC[c|onsccutivc terms of probation may . . . allow a 
greater amount of restitution to be paid." IcL at 555. It did not, however, assess whether 
restitution is a statutorily-stated purpose of probation in Maine and/or whether its statute 
rehabilitated, adding to the overcrowding of prisons and jails, and diluting AP&P's 
already meager resources. Sec Pct'r Br. at 9-25. 
1 he State cites Delaware as a state whose statute permits a longer probationary 
term wCtto ensure the collection of any restitution ordered/" Rcsp't Br. at 35 n.5 (quoting 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 1 K § 4333 (b), -(d)(3) (2008)). Like Utah, however, Delaware's 
statute says that wCany period of probation" ordered "to ensure the collection of any 
restitution" that exceeds the statutory limitation (generally "|o|nc year" and up to w'|t|\vo 
years, for any violent felony") "shall be served" as bench probation. Id. at § 4333(b)(1)-
(3); (d)(3). 
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violates due process. Id. at 553-55. Because it imposes a four-year statutory limit on 
probationary terms, except in express situations, it is unlikely that Maine's statute has the 
same constitutional difficulties as ours. Skx Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, §1202(1), (1-
A).(l-B)(2007). 
Moreover, DadieRO is distinguishable because it involved consecutive 
probationary terms. Dadicgo, 617 A.2d at 554-55. In this case, the trial court imposed 
one long probationary term. Candcdo, 2008 UT App 4 at ^3. Plus, Utah's appellate 
courts have not yet decided whether Utah's probation statute allows consecutive 
probationary terms. See Wallace, 2006 UT 86 at *|[4 (declining to address "whether terms 
of probation for multiple convictions may be imposed consecutively" because it was 
unnecessary given the Court's "conclusion] that the Legislature has not limited terms of 
probation to any particular time period"); Candcdo, 2008 UT App 4 at *\\4 (following 
Wallace and deciding that it "need not consider whether" the trial court could impose 
"consecutive probation periods where multiple crimes were committed"). 
Finally, the State lists several jurisdictions whose statutes leave probation ''entirely 
in the court's discretion or permit probation to extend to the maximum sentence of 
confinement authorized by statute." Wayne R. LaFavc ct al., Criminal Procedure, § 
26.9(a), at 862 (2007) (hereinafter LaFavc, Criminal Procedure); see Rcsp't Br. at 35 n.5. 
Hie State's list largely mirrors the list provided in Candedo's opening brief. Compare 
Pct'r Br. at 17 n.4 with Rcsp't Br. at 35 n.5. liven including the additional citations 
provided by the State, these statutes—particularly those like Utah's that do not limit 
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probation even to the length of the allowable prison term-—represent the minority 
approach. See Rcsp'l Br. at 35 n.5. 
Tying "'the term of probation to the often lengthy authorized term of 
imprisonment/' let alone allowing probation to continue beyond the authorized prison 
term, is regarded as "unwise" and is not espoused by "|m|odern statutes." LaLave, 
Criminal Procedure, §26.9(a). at 862; sec Pct'r Br. at 17-19. "Such open-ended authority 
not only may subject the offender to a pointlessly extended jeopardy, but it aggravates the 
caseload burden of the probation staff as well." kf (citation omitted). Moreover, at least 
in Utah, this approach violates due process because it is not rationally related to our 
Legislature's stated legitimate interest in rehabilitation. See Pct'r Br. at 9-25. 
In sum, the statutorily-stated purpose of probation in Utah is rehabilitation. 
Restitution, on the other hand, is statutorily excluded as a possible purpose of probation. 
And the State has not identified any other purposes of probation contemplated by our 
Legislature.^ As interpreted by Wallace, therefore, the probation statute violates due 
5
 To the extent that the Legislature may have contemplated other purposes—such 
as public safety —these purposes are not at issue here. The trial court imposed the 108-
month probationary term because Candedo owed restitution, not because it was 
concerned about public safety. R. 270:34-35; Rcsp'l Br. at 36 (stating probationary 
purpose "in this case" is "victim restitution"). This makes sense because Candedo was 
not convicted of a violent oflense. Sex R. 207-08; 219; 269:9. Further, to the extent that 
our Legislature has identified public safety as a purpose of probation, it has statutorily 
limited this purpose to specific offenses that do not apply here. Sec, e.g., Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-406.5(2) (Supp. 2008) (allowing probation periods in certain sexual offense 
against a child cases "for up to a maximum often years"); State v. Pritchctt, 2003 UT 24, 
^|30, 69 P.3d 1278 (purpose of probation under section 76-5-406.5 "cis to avoid 
compounding the harm already suffered while protecting the victim from further abuse*" 
(citation omitted)). 
16 
process because it does not rationally further our Legislature's stated legitimate interest in 
rehabilitation. Sec Pct'r Br. at 7-31. To the contrary, as explained in Candcdo's opening 
brief, it actually undermines probation's rehabilitative goals by making a defendant feel 
like an outsider even when he is rehabilitated, adding to the overcrowding of prisons and 
jails, and diluting AP&P's already meager resources. See id. Thus, this Court should 
reverse and remand for resentencing because the nine-year probationary term ordered in 
Candcdo's case exceeds the limits of constitutionality. 
IL THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT 
CANDEDO'S DUE PROCESS ARGUMENT COULD NOT BE 
RAISED UNDER RULE 22(c) 
'The purpose of rule 22(e) is to allow correction of manifestly illegal sentences.'* 
State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, «j|5, 48 P.3d 228; see Pct'r Br. at 31. Rule 22(c), however, 
is not a rubherstamp that limits this Court to reversing an illegal sentence only if it has 
previously addressed the issue and declared the sentence illegal. Resp't Br. at 14, 17. To 
the contrary, it is a "sweeping" rule that allows this Court to '"correct an illegal sentence, 
or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time.'" State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 
858-60 (Utah 1995) (quoting Utah R. Crim. P. 22(c)). 
"|A|n illegal sentence is void." Telford, 2002 UT 51 at *|J5. This means that 
regardless of whether a court has previously determined the sentence is illegal, it is u[o]f 
liven if the Legislature identified public safety as a purpose of probation, this 
Court should still reverse because Utah's probation statute is not rationally related to 
achieving public safety for the same reason that it is not rationally related to achieving 
rehabilitation. Lengthy probationary terms undermine probation's rehabilitative goals by 
making a defendant feel like an outsider even when he is rehabilitated, adding to the 
overcrowding of prisons and jails, and diluting AP&P\s already meager resources. Sec 
Pct'r Br. at 7-31. These results equally undermine public safety. 
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no legal effect" and is "null" from its inception. Black's Law Dictionary, 1604 (8 1 ed. 
2004); compare Black's Law Dictionary, 1605 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "voidable" as 
meaning "|v]alid until annulled"). Manifestly illegal sentences, therefore, arc not limited 
to those sentences that "direct) ly] conflict with the express language" of "existing law." 
RcspT Br. at 14, 17. Nor are they limited to those sentences that have been previously 
adjudicated and declared illegal. Sec id. 
In two cases cited by Candedo in his opening brief, this Court relied on "the 
express language" of "existing" decisions, Resp't Br. at 14, to determine whether the 
challenged sentence was illegal. Sec Telford, 2002 UT 51 at *\\3 (using rule 22(e) to reach 
defendant\s claim that indeterminate sentencing violated Utah Constitution's separation 
of powers clause but affirming because "|t]his court has already addressed and rejected" 
defendant's contention in another case): State v. Iligginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 551 (Utah 
1996) (remanding pursuant to rule 22(e) because prior case law determined that statute 
"docs not authorize a consecutive, determinate two-year term as was given here" 
(citations omitted)). In Telford, however, this Court stated that it may have been willing 
to "depart from [its] established precedent" and conduct a new analysis under rule 22(c) 
regarding the legality of Utah's indeterminate sentencing scheme if defendant had 
"provided" the necessary "basis." Telford, 2002 UT 51 at «,|3. 
Further, in the other cases cited by Candedo, this Court and the court of appeals 
conducted unique and at times first impression —analyses to determine whether the 
challenged sentence was illegal and required correction under rule 22(e). Sec State v. 
S amor a, 2004 UT 79, f|jl3, 99 P.3d 858 (holding, as a matter of first impression in a case 
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where the court of appeals previously vacated a sentence under rule 22(c) because it 
violated rule 22(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, that "a sentence imposed in 
violation of rule 22(a) . . . may be considered a 'sentence imposed in an illegal manner' 
under rule 22(c)"); Kuchncrt v. Turner, 499 P.2d 839, 840-41 (Utah 1975) (looking to 
cases from other jurisdictions for guidance and holding, in an instance of first impression, 
that a sentence is illegal if defendant "was without counsel," was not informed of his 
right to counsel, and did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel at 
sentencing); State v. Garner, 2008 UT App 32, ^ 1 8 , 20-25, 177 P.3d 637 (reviewing 
"[defendant's claim that Utah's indeterminate sentencing scheme violates his Sixth 
Amendment rights" under rule 22(e) even though it is a matter of first impression and 
"centers on recent United States Supreme Court Sixth Amendment jurisprudence"); State 
v. Headley, 2002 UT App 58, 2002 WL 287890, * 1-3 (using rule 22(c) to reach 
defendant's arguments that he received ineffective assistance at sentencing and that trial 
court "relied on information in the presentence report that the court knew was false," but 
rejecting claims because record is incomplete). 
In this case. Candedo does not invoke rule 22(e) to challenge his underlying 
conviction. Sec, e.g., State v. Nicholls, 2006 UT 76, ^[5, 148 P.3d 990 (declining to reach 
defendant's argument because "substance of the appeal is . . . a challenge, not to the 
sentence itself, but to the underlying conviction" (alteration in original) (citations 
omitted)); Telford, 2002 UT 51 at ^[6-7 (same); State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, ^[2-3, 5, 40 
P.3d 630 (same); State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, ^[8, 994 P.2d 1243 (same); State v. 
Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 860 (Utah 1995) (same). Rather, he asks this Court to determine 
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whether his 108-month probationary term is illegal because it violates substantive due 
process. Sec Pet'r Br. at 1-2; Order dated July 11, 2008. This issue is within the 
'"sweeping" bounds that this Court has set for rule 22(c). Brooks. 908 P.2d at 860; see 
Telford, 2002 UT 51 at lfl|2-4 (invoking rule 22(c) to reach defendant's argument that 
indeterminate sentencing violates Utah's due process clause). Thus, this Court should 
reverse the court of appeals' decision and use rule 22(c) to address Candcdo's due 
process claim on the merits. 
HI. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT 
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES DID NOT JUSTIFY 
REACHING CAN DEPP'S DUE PROCESS ARGUMENT 
If "exceptional circumstances exist," then this Court will reach the merits of an 
unprcscrved issue. State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29,^[16, 94 P.3d 186. This 
Court has never said that it will only apply the exceptional circumstances doctrine to 
cases where the need to reverse is immediately apparent. See Resp't Br. at 23 n.2. 
Rather, it has said that it will apply the exceptional circumstances doctrine wherever an 
appellate court's "failure to consider an issue that was not properly preserved for appeal" 
will result "in manifest injustice." Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29 at ^23. 
In State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1994), a case cited in the State's brief, 
exceptional circumstances did not exist because the defendant's failure to preserve his 
state due process claim was a matter of choice. In that case, the defendant argued to the 
trial court "that the photo array was impermissibly suggestive under the federal Due 
Process Clause." Lopez, 886 P.2d at 1111. lie could have argued the state due process 
clause as well, but he chose not to. M. at 1113. Then, during his appeal, this Court 
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issued State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), holding that Utah's due process 
analysis is "as stringent as, if not more stringent than, the federal analysis," and diverging 
from the federal analytical model for determining the "due process reliability of 
eyewitness identifications." Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784. Ramirez might have strengthened 
defendant's state due process argument, but it did not change the landscape on which 
defendant relied. Lopez, 886 P.2d at 1113. With or without Ramirez, defendant knew 
that he had to preserve his state due process claim if he wanted to argue it on appeal. IcL 
Conversely, in State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994), a case cited in 
Candcdo's opening brief, exceptional circumstances existed because the defendant's 
failure to preserve his claim for appeal was not a matter of choice but of reasonable 
reliance on the law, as it existed at the time. ''At the time of the suppression hearing" in 
that case, "the pretext doctrine was the controlling rule of Fourth Amendment law." 
Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1134 n.2. The defendant, therefore, "had no reason to argue that the 
doctrine be adopted under article 1, section 14 [of the Utah Constitution] until the State 
challenged the doctrine on appeal." Id.; sec also State v. Haston, 846 P.2d 1276, 1277 
(Utah 1993) (per curiam) (holding that "Mailing to consider defendant's issue would 
constitute manifest injustice" where this Court determined, after defendant was 
convicted, "that Utah docs not recognize the crime" defendant was convicted of). 
In this case, exceptional circumstances exist because Candcdo's failure to preserve 
his due process claim was not a matter of choice, but of reasonable reliance on settled 
law. See Pet'r Br. at 35-39. Before Wallace, the court of appeals' decisions in State v. 
Robinson, 860 P.2d 979 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), cert, denied. 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994). 
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and Slate v. McDonald, 2005 UT App 86, 110 P.3d 149, cert, denied, 124 P.3d 251 (Utah 
2005), provided the controlling interpretation of the probation statute. That interpretation 
raised no substantive due process concerns because it said that a trial court "exceeded its 
statutory authority" if it imposed a probationary term longer than the 12- or 36-month 
terms outlined in the probation statute. McDonald, 2005 UT App 86 at f||19; see 
Robinson, 860 P.2d at 982 (holding that "Ihc maximum formal probation periods for. . . 
a class B misdemeanor, and for . . . a class A misdemeanor, are respectively twelve 
months and thirty-six months." (citing Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(8)(a)(i) (Supp. 1992))). 
At sentencing. Candedo argued that the trial court did not have authority to impose 
a 108-month probationary period. With McDonald and Robinson as controlling 
precedent, this was the appropriate argument to make and the argument likely to prevail. 
See McDonald, 2005 UT App 86 at in[20, 22 (ordering that "trial court's probation order 
is hereby terminated as of February 26, 2004," the end of the statutorily-imposcd twelve-
month period). Candedo could not be expected to predict that this Court would overrule 
McDonald and Robinson and reinterpret the probation statute to allow limitless 
probationary terms. See Wallace, 2006 UT 86 at ^[13-14. Nor could he be expected to 
predict the constitutional implications this Court's future decision would raise and to 
present those implications to the trial court. Thus, denying him the opportunity to 
challenge the legality of the trial court's probationary order under the new landscape 
created by Wallace would result "in manifest injustice." Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29 
at 1|23; see Ilaston, 846 P.2d at 1277. 
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CONCLUSION 
Candcdo respectfully asks this Court to reverse and remand for resentencing 
because his sentence to serve a nine-year probationary period violates due process. 
Candcdo asks this Court to reach the merits of his argument through either rule 22(e) of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure or the exceptional circumstances doctrine. 
SUBMITTED this _ j ^ _ day of December, 2008. 
cc^iS^^v^ 
LORI J. SEPPI 
Attorney for Defendant/Petitioner 
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